Issue

Does the arrest and prolonged detention of X without being presented before a magistrate, leading to X's death in police custody, violate constitutional and legal provisions? What is the liability of the police under Indian law for the illegal detention and custodial death?

Rule

1. Article 21 of the Constitution of India:
   "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law."
   Any action resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty must adhere to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and due process.

2. Article 22 of the Constitution of India:

   • Article 22(1) mandates that a person who is arrested must be informed of the grounds of arrest and has the right to consult a legal practitioner of their choice.
   • Article 22(2) requires that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding the time taken for travel. Failure to do so makes the detention illegal.

3. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):
   This section reiterates the constitutional mandate under Article 22(2), emphasizing that an arrested person must be presented before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.

4. Section 176 of the CrPC:
   This provision mandates a judicial or magistrate inquiry in cases of custodial death. It ensures transparency and accountability in investigating deaths occurring in police custody.

5. Right Against Torture:
   Though India does not have a specific anti-torture law, custodial torture and deaths violate Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. In the absence of a specific law, courts have emphasized accountability under constitutional rights.

6. Relevant Precedents:

   • D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997): The Supreme Court laid down guidelines to prevent custodial violence and deaths. These include:
     • Immediate production of the arrested person before a magistrate.
     • Maintenance of an arrest memo.
     • Informing the arrested person's family.
   • Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993): The court held that custodial deaths violate Article 21 and imposed the principle of strict liability on the state for such violations. Compensation was granted as a public law remedy.

7. Maxim:

   • Ubi jus ibi remedium (Where there is a right, there is a remedy): This maxim is applied in cases where fundamental rights are violated, ensuring the availability of legal recourse.
   • Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (An act does not make a person guilty unless there is criminal intent): This principle applies to the accountability of officials in custodial deaths.

Application

1. Violation of Article 21:

   • X’s prolonged detention without being produced before a magistrate violates the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. This procedural lapse amounts to illegal detention.
   • The death of X in custody, without justification or due investigation, constitutes a gross violation of Article 21.

2. Violation of Article 22 and Section 57 of CrPC:

   • X was not presented before a magistrate within 24 hours, as mandated by law. This procedural breach renders the detention illegal.
   • The police action in detaining X without judicial oversight amounts to an abuse of authority and undermines the rule of law.

3. Liability for Custodial Death:

   • Under the guidelines in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, the police officers involved are liable for failing to ensure the safety of X in custody.
   • The principle of vicarious liability makes the state responsible for X’s custodial death, entitling his family to compensation.
   • The officers may also face criminal charges for wrongful confinement (Section 342, IPC), culpable homicide (Section 304, IPC), or even murder (Section 302, IPC), depending on the circumstances of the death.

4. Mandatory Inquiry under Section 176 of CrPC:

   • A judicial or magistrate inquiry must be conducted to investigate the cause of X’s death in custody. The findings of this inquiry can be used to initiate further legal action against the officers responsible.

Conclusion

The arrest and detention of X without being produced before a magistrate, followed by his death in custody, violate Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and provisions under the CrPC. Such actions reflect grave abuse of power by the police. The state is liable to provide compensation to X’s family under public law principles, and the officers involved should be prosecuted for illegal detention and custodial death. Further, a judicial inquiry under Section 176 of the CrPC must be initiated to ascertain the circumstances of X’s death, ensuring justice is served and accountability upheld.

Issue

Can X challenge the action of the state government officer preventing him from carrying on his business under the provisions of the Constitution of India? Does this action violate X's fundamental rights, particularly under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 300A?

Rule

1. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India:
   Every citizen has the fundamental right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business.

2. Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19(6):
   The state may impose reasonable restrictions on this right in the interest of:

   • The general public.
   • Requirements of law to regulate specific trades or professions.
     However, such restrictions must be reasonable and backed by valid legal authority.

3. Article 300A of the Constitution of India:
   Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of their property except by the authority of law. Preventing X from conducting his business without legal justification can also amount to deprivation of property rights.

4. Doctrine of Rule of Law:
   Actions of the state and its officers must comply with the principles of legality, fairness, and reasonableness. Arbitrary actions by state authorities violate this doctrine.

5. Judicial Precedents:

   • Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. (1954): The Supreme Court held that the right to carry on a business is protected under Article 19(1)(g) and any unreasonable restriction imposed by the state is unconstitutional.
   • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978): The procedure established by law must be just, fair, and reasonable. Arbitrary interference in fundamental rights is invalid.
   • State of M.P. v. Thakur Bharat Singh (1967): It was held that executive actions without statutory authority violate fundamental rights and are unconstitutional.

6. Maxim: Ubi jus ibi remedium (Where there is a right, there is a remedy):
   If a fundamental or legal right is violated, the aggrieved party has the right to seek appropriate redress.

Application

1. Violation of Article 19(1)(g):

   • X’s right to carry on his business has been arbitrarily restricted by the officer without any legal authority or reasonable justification.
   • There is no indication that the restriction was imposed in the public interest or under a law that satisfies the conditions of Article 19(6).

2. Violation of Article 300A:

   • By preventing X from carrying on his business, the officer has indirectly deprived him of his right to property (profits and income from the business) without the authority of law, violating Article 300A.

3. Arbitrary State Action:

   • If the officer's action is not backed by statutory authority or is in violation of procedural fairness, it is unconstitutional.
   • Such actions also breach the principle of the rule of law, as the officer has acted beyond their legal powers (ultra vires).

4. Remedy Available to X:

   • X can file a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court or under Article 32 in the Supreme Court for enforcement of his fundamental rights.
   • X can seek the following reliefs:
     • A writ of Mandamus directing the officer to cease obstructing his business.
     • Compensation for the loss suffered due to the illegal action of the officer.

Conclusion

The officer’s action in preventing X from carrying on his business is unconstitutional as it violates X’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 300A of the Constitution. X can challenge this arbitrary action by filing a writ petition under Articles 32 or 226, seeking appropriate relief such as a writ of mandamus, compensation, and restoration of his right to conduct his business. The state government will need to justify the officer’s action and prove its legality; failing which, X is entitled to remedies for the violation of his constitutional rights.

Issue

Does employing a 15-year-old child as a domestic servant violate the legal provisions of child labor laws in India? What are the consequences for the employer under Indian laws?

Rule

1. Article 24 of the Constitution of India:
   "No child below the age of 14 years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment."
   Although Article 24 explicitly prohibits hazardous employment, subsequent legislation has expanded the scope of prohibited employment for children.

2. The Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (as amended in 2016):

   • Section 3: Prohibits the employment of children below 14 years in any occupation or process.
   • Adolescents (14-18 years) are prohibited from working in hazardous occupations or processes listed in the Schedule to the Act.

3. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Rules, 2017:
   Domestic work, including work in houses, hotels, and dhabas, is classified as a hazardous occupation for children under the age of 18. Therefore, employing a child as a domestic servant is prohibited.

4. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015:

   • Section 79: Criminalizes the exploitation of a child through employment, with penalties for employing a child in contravention of labor laws.
   • Penalty: Imprisonment for up to 5 years or a fine of ₹1 lakh, or both.

5. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976:
   If the child is found working under coercion, forced labor, or bonded labor, the employer can be prosecuted under this Act.

6. ILO Conventions Ratified by India:

   • Convention 138: Minimum Age for Employment.
   • Convention 182: Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour.

7. Maxim:

   • Ignorantia juris non excusat (Ignorance of the law is no excuse): The employer cannot claim ignorance of child labor laws as a defense.

Application

1. Violation of Article 24:
   While the child is 15 years old, domestic work is considered a hazardous occupation under the rules. Therefore, employing a child in such work violates Article 24 of the Constitution.

2. Violation of the Child and Adolescent Labour Act:

   • The employer violated Section 3 of the Act by engaging a child below 18 years in hazardous work.
   • The amendment of 2016 and the rules of 2017 explicitly prohibit domestic work by children.

3. Exploitation under the Juvenile Justice Act:

   • Employing a child as a domestic servant may amount to exploitation under Section 79 of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially if the working conditions are harsh or abusive.
   • The employer is liable for criminal prosecution under this provision.

4. Consequences for the Employer:

   • Penalties under the Child Labour Act:
     • Imprisonment for a term ranging from 6 months to 2 years.
     • Fine of ₹20,000 to ₹50,000, or both.
   • Penalties under the Juvenile Justice Act:
     • Imprisonment for up to 5 years or a fine of ₹1 lakh, or both.

5. Preventive Measures:

   • The employer should ensure compliance with child labor laws and employ only adults (18+ years) for domestic work.
   • Reporting any such employment by neighbors or witnesses to child welfare authorities is a civic duty.

Conclusion

Employing a 15-year-old child as a domestic servant is a clear violation of Indian child labor laws and constitutional protections under Article 24. The employer is liable for prosecution under the Child and Adolescent Labour Act, 1986 (as amended), and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The penalties include imprisonment and fines, emphasizing the strict approach of Indian law to eradicate child labor. The child must also be rehabilitated through child welfare mechanisms to ensure their rights are protected.

Issue

• Is there a violation of fundamental rights in the case of X’s death due to torture in police custody?
• Does the Constitution of India guarantee a fundamental right against torture?
• What remedies are available to X’s wife for seeking justice?

Rule

1. Article 21 of the Constitution of India:

   • Protects the right to life and personal liberty, stating: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
   • The Supreme Court has held that custodial torture or death is a direct violation of Article 21.

2. Article 22 of the Constitution of India:

   • Provides protection against arbitrary arrest and detention.
   • Requires that arrested persons must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours and should not be detained without proper legal authority.

3. Judicial Precedents:

   • D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997):
     • The Supreme Court laid down guidelines to prevent custodial torture and deaths, including the duty to inform relatives of the detainee and the right to medical examination.
     • Violation of these guidelines amounts to a breach of fundamental rights under Article 21.
   • Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993):
     • The Court held the state liable for custodial death and awarded compensation for violation of Article 21.

4. Fundamental Right against Torture:

   • While the Constitution does not explicitly mention a "fundamental right against torture," Articles 20(3), 21, and 22 collectively prohibit torture, inhuman treatment, and arbitrary detention.

5. International Commitments:

   • India is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT), which prohibits torture and inhuman treatment. Although India has not ratified the convention, the Supreme Court has emphasized its principles.

6. Maxims:

   • Ubi jus ibi remedium (Where there is a right, there is a remedy): Violation of fundamental rights mandates remedies under the law.
   • Actio personalis moritur cum persona (Personal actions die with the person): Does not apply to violations of fundamental rights, as remedies extend to legal heirs.

7. Remedies Available:

   • Article 32: Right to directly approach the Supreme Court for violation of fundamental rights.
   • Article 226: Right to approach the High Court for writ jurisdiction, including Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, or Compensation.
   • Compensation Jurisprudence: The courts have awarded compensation for custodial deaths as a public law remedy for infringement of Article 21.

8. Relevant Statutes:

   • Indian Penal Code (IPC):
     • Section 330: Punishes voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession.
     • Section 331: Punishes voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort confession.
     • Section 302: Punishes custodial deaths as murder.
   • Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC):
     • Section 176(1A): Mandates judicial inquiry in cases of custodial death.

Application

1. Violation of Article 21:

   • The custodial torture and subsequent death of X amount to a direct infringement of his right to life under Article 21.
   • Torture in custody violates the guidelines laid down in D.K. Basu and fails to comply with procedural safeguards under Articles 21 and 22.

2. State Liability:

   • Under vicarious liability, the state is responsible for the wrongful acts of its police officers.
   • The wife of X can seek monetary compensation for the violation of X’s fundamental rights.

3. Criminal Liability:

   • Police officers involved in the torture and death of X can be prosecuted under IPC Sections 330, 331, and 302.
   • A judicial inquiry under Section 176(1A) of the CrPC is mandatory.

4. Remedies for the Wife of X:

   • File a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court for:
     • A writ of Mandamus to ensure proper investigation.
     • A writ of Habeas Corpus to establish accountability for the unlawful detention.
     • Compensation for the violation of fundamental rights.
   • Alternatively, approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 for similar relief.
   • File a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.

Conclusion

The death of X in police custody due to torture is a clear violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution. While there is no explicit "right against torture," the courts have interpreted the Constitution to protect individuals from custodial torture and arbitrary actions. X’s wife has strong legal grounds to challenge the custodial death by filing a writ petition in the High Court or Supreme Court, seeking compensation, criminal action against the responsible police officers, and enforcement of constitutional safeguards. Additionally, she can lodge a complaint with the NHRC to ensure a fair and impartial investigation.

Issue

• Was the detention of A for one week without informing him of the grounds of arrest and without being produced before a magistrate a violation of his fundamental rights under the Constitution of India?
• What remedies are available to A for the violation of his rights?

Rule

1. Article 22 of the Constitution of India:

   • Clause (1): No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed of the grounds of arrest and shall have the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice.
   • Clause (2): A person arrested must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. Failure to do so renders the detention illegal.

2. Article 21 of the Constitution of India:

   • Protects the right to life and personal liberty. Arbitrary arrest and detention without following proper legal procedures violate this fundamental right.

3. Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973:

   • Section 50: The police must inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest and their right to bail.
   • Section 56: The arrested person must be produced before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
   • Section 57: Detention beyond 24 hours without the magistrate's approval is illegal.

4. Judicial Precedents:

   • D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997): The Supreme Court laid down guidelines to prevent custodial abuse and arbitrary arrest, emphasizing procedural safeguards such as informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest and producing them before a magistrate within 24 hours.
   • Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1994): The Court held that the arrest must not only be legal but also justified, ensuring that individual liberty is not compromised arbitrarily.

5. Maxim:

   • Ubi jus ibi remedium (Where there is a right, there is a remedy): A’s fundamental rights have been violated, and he is entitled to seek legal remedies.

6. Remedies under Public Law:

   • Compensation for Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Supreme Court has held in cases like Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa that compensation is a public law remedy for violation of fundamental rights.

Application

1. Violation of Article 22:

   • A was detained for one week without being informed of the grounds of arrest or being produced before a magistrate, violating his constitutional rights under Article 22(1) and 22(2).

2. Violation of Article 21:

   • The arbitrary arrest and detention without following due process of law amount to a violation of A’s right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

3. CrPC Violations:

   • Failure to inform A of the grounds of arrest violates Section 50 of the CrPC.
   • Detention beyond 24 hours without a magistrate’s authorization violates Sections 56 and 57 of the CrPC.

4. Remedies for A:

   • A can file a writ petition under Article 32 or 226 for the violation of his fundamental rights, seeking:
     • A writ of Mandamus to ensure accountability of the police officers involved.
     • Compensation for unlawful detention and mental agony caused by the arbitrary actions of the police.
   • A can also file a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 for custodial abuse and unlawful detention.

5. Criminal and Disciplinary Action Against Police Officers:

   • The responsible police officers may be prosecuted for wrongful confinement under Section 342 of the IPC and other relevant provisions.
   • Disciplinary action may also be initiated against them by their department.

Conclusion

The detention of A for one week without informing him of the grounds of arrest and without producing him before a magistrate violates his fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. A has strong grounds to file a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 to seek compensation for the violation of his rights. Additionally, A can initiate criminal proceedings against the erring police officers and file a complaint with the NHRC for further redressal. The police cannot escape liability for such blatant violations of legal and constitutional safeguards.

Issue

• Can the permission granted to a Muslim male to marry more than one wife under personal laws be challenged as a violation of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India?
• Is the practice of polygamy protected under the personal laws of Muslims, and can it be scrutinized under the Constitution?

Rule

1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India:

   • Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws within the territory of India.
   • The principle of equality does not mean absolute equality but allows for reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and a rational nexus to the objective sought.

2. Article 25 of the Constitution of India:

   • Guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health.
   • Practices forming an essential part of religion are protected under this article.

3. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937:

   • Governs Muslims in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other personal issues.
   • Permits a Muslim male to marry up to four wives, provided he treats them equally and fulfills the conditions laid down in Islamic law.

4. Judicial Precedents:

   • Narasu Appa Mali v. State of Bombay (1951):

     • The Bombay High Court held that personal laws are not "laws" within the meaning of Article 13 and, hence, cannot be challenged on the ground of fundamental rights.
     • The Court observed that religious practices like polygamy are protected under personal laws and are not subject to judicial review for violation of Article 14.

   • Javed v. State of Haryana (2003):

     • The Supreme Court observed that polygamy is not an integral part of Islam, and the State can legislate to restrict or regulate polygamy under its power to ensure social welfare.
     • However, the Court upheld the validity of a State law that disqualified candidates with more than two children from contesting local elections, stating that personal law practices cannot override legislative provisions aimed at achieving societal goals.

5. Maxims:

   • Salus populi suprema lex (The welfare of the people is the supreme law): The State has the power to regulate practices, even religious ones, in the interest of social welfare.
   • Generalia specialibus non derogant (General laws do not derogate from special laws): Personal laws hold a unique position and are not overridden by general laws unless explicitly stated.

Application

1. Right to Equality (Article 14):

   • Polygamy is permitted under Muslim personal law, which applies specifically to Muslims.
   • Article 14 permits reasonable classification, and personal laws are based on religious practices and beliefs, forming an intelligible differentia.

2. Freedom of Religion (Article 25):

   • The practice of polygamy is derived from Islamic religious texts and is considered part of the personal law of Muslims.
   • While not integral to the religion, it is a protected practice under Article 25 unless explicitly restricted by legislation.

3. Judicial Interpretation:

   • In Narasu Appa Mali, the Court held that personal laws cannot be challenged on the ground of fundamental rights. Thus, the permission for polygamy under Muslim personal law does not violate Article 14.
   • However, the State has the power to regulate or prohibit polygamy through legislative measures if it deems it necessary for social reform, as highlighted in Javed v. State of Haryana.

4. Current Legal Position:

   • Polygamy remains permissible under Muslim personal law in India, and it is not considered a violation of Article 14 due to the special status of personal laws.
   • A Hindu cannot challenge the validity of Muslim personal law, as it governs a specific religious community and is protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

The permission granted to a Muslim male under personal law to marry more than one wife does not violate the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. Personal laws are considered separate from statutory laws and are protected under Article 25, subject to public order, morality, and health. As per the Narasu Appa Mali judgment, personal laws cannot be challenged on the grounds of fundamental rights. However, the State retains the power to legislate reforms in personal laws to achieve social welfare and equality. Therefore, the Hindu challenging this practice would have no legal standing to succeed in this matter unless the State enacts specific legislation prohibiting polygamy.

Issue

• Can a university student seek a prohibition on smoking within the university premises?
• What legal grounds exist for prohibiting smoking in public places like a university campus in India?

Rule

1. Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India:

   • Article 21 guarantees the Right to Life and personal liberty, which includes the right to a clean, healthy, and pollution-free environment.
   • Smoking on the university campus endangers the health and well-being of others, violating their right to a healthy environment.

2. The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply, and Distribution) Act, 2003 (COTPA):

   • Section 4: Prohibits smoking in public places. A university is considered a public place under the Act.
   • Section 6: Prohibits the sale of tobacco products within 100 meters of educational institutions.
   • Section 24: Empowers enforcement authorities to impose fines on violators.

3. Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP):

   • Article 47: The State shall endeavor to improve public health and prohibit the consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs that are injurious to health. Smoking, being injurious to health, can be restricted based on this directive.

4. Environment Protection Act, 1986:

   • Smoking contributes to air pollution, which falls under environmental hazards. Under this Act, smoking in public places can be regulated to ensure a pollution-free environment.

5. Relevant Judicial Precedents:

   • Murli S. Deora v. Union of India (2001): The Supreme Court recognized passive smoking as injurious to non-smokers and directed the prohibition of smoking in public places such as educational institutions, hospitals, and public offices.
   • K. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala (1999): The Kerala High Court held that non-smokers have a right to be protected from the harmful effects of smoking under Article 21.

6. Doctrine of Public Trust:

   • The State, as a trustee of public health, has a duty to ensure that public places remain free from activities like smoking that harm public health.

Application

1. Violation of Fundamental Rights:

   • Smoking on the university premises jeopardizes the health of non-smokers, violating their right to life under Article 21. The student can argue that passive smoking endangers the well-being of students, faculty, and visitors on the campus.

2. Violation of Statutory Law (COTPA, 2003):

   • Smoking on university premises is a violation of Section 4 of the COTPA, which prohibits smoking in public places.
   • If tobacco products are being sold on or near the campus, it violates Section 6 of the Act, and the authorities are obligated to enforce this prohibition.

3. Judicial Mandates:

   • Based on Murli S. Deora v. Union of India, the university authorities are required to ensure that the campus remains smoke-free to protect the health of students and staff.

4. Public Interest:

   • The student can argue that prohibiting smoking aligns with public health objectives under Article 47 of the Constitution and safeguards the campus environment.

Conclusion

The student can seek a prohibition of smoking on the university campus based on:

1. The fundamental right to life and a clean environment under Article 21 of the Constitution.
2. The provisions of the COTPA, 2003, specifically Sections 4 and 6, which prohibit smoking in public places and the sale of tobacco products near educational institutions.
3. Judicial precedents like Murli S. Deora v. Union of India, which mandate a smoke-free environment in public places.

The student can approach the university administration or file a complaint with the relevant enforcement authorities under the COTPA, 2003. If the issue persists, the student may file a public interest litigation (PIL) in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a directive to ensure strict enforcement of the law and protect public health on the campus.

Issue

• Can the Devasthanam Board appoint a person not belonging to the priestly class as a poojari in a Hindu temple?
• Does such an appointment violate religious traditions, customs, or fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution?
• Can religious customs override constitutional principles of equality and social reform?

Rule

1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India:

   • Guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, caste, sex, or place of birth.
   • Any appointment made by a public authority like a Devasthanam Board must adhere to the principles of equality.

2. Article 25 of the Constitution of India:

   • Guarantees the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health.
   • The protection extends only to essential religious practices.

3. Article 26 of the Constitution of India:

   • Grants religious denominations the right to manage their religious affairs. However, this right is not absolute and is subject to public order, morality, and health.

4. Case Law:

   • Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972):

     • The Supreme Court held that the performance of religious rituals is an essential religious function, but the appointment of priests (poojaris) is a secular function. The Court upheld the Tamil Nadu Government's power to appoint priests, subject to qualifications and not necessarily restricted to traditional caste-based rules.

   • Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2015):

     • The Supreme Court reiterated that the appointment of priests should be based on merit and qualification, not caste. It clarified that appointment policies must adhere to constitutional principles of equality.

5. Maxims and Doctrines:

   • Lex suprema lex (The Constitution is supreme law): Religious customs must yield to constitutional mandates.
   • Doctrine of Essential Practices: Only practices integral to the religion are protected under Articles 25 and 26. Non-essential practices like caste-based restrictions on appointing priests are not immune to constitutional scrutiny.

Application

1. Secular Nature of Appointment:

   • The appointment of a poojari involves selecting someone qualified to perform rituals, which is not inherently a religious practice but an administrative or secular function.
   • The Devasthanam Board has the authority to make appointments, provided the appointee meets the necessary qualifications and adheres to temple rituals.

2. Caste-Based Restrictions:

   • Caste-based restrictions on the appointment of priests do not qualify as essential religious practices and, therefore, are not protected under Articles 25 or 26.
   • The Supreme Court in Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam explicitly rejected the argument that only members of a particular caste or class can serve as temple priests.

3. Equality and Social Reform:

   • Restricting priesthood to a particular class violates Article 14 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on caste.
   • The appointment of non-priestly class individuals aligns with the constitutional goal of eradicating caste-based discrimination and promoting social equality.

Conclusion

The challenge to the appointment of a non-priestly class individual as poojari in a Hindu temple is not sustainable. The Supreme Court has consistently held that caste-based restrictions on appointing priests are unconstitutional and do not form an essential part of religion.

The Devasthanam Board has the right to appoint any qualified individual as a poojari, provided they possess the required knowledge and ability to perform temple rituals. This aligns with the principles of equality under Article 14 and the constitutional mandate for social reform. Therefore, the appointment made by the Devasthanam Board is valid and cannot be struck down on the grounds of tradition or custom.

Issue

• Is a restriction on the entry of women in a public temple, based on certain ancient scriptures, valid under the Indian Constitution?
• Can such a restriction be justified as an essential religious practice, or does it violate fundamental rights like equality and non-discrimination?

Rule

1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India:

   • Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion, caste, sex, or place of birth.
   • A law or practice that discriminates based on sex may violate Article 14 if it does not meet the test of reasonable classification or public interest.

2. Article 15 of the Constitution of India:

   • Prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth in matters of access to public places, including places of worship.
   • The state cannot allow discrimination based on sex in such places unless it is justified by a valid exception under the Constitution.

3. Article 25 of the Constitution of India:

   • Guarantees the right to freedom of religion, allowing individuals to profess, practice, and propagate their religion.
   • However, this freedom is subject to public order, morality, and health, and practices not deemed essential to religion may be subject to constitutional scrutiny.

4. Article 26 of the Constitution of India:

   • Allows religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs, including the right to maintain their temples and regulate the entry of worshippers.
   • However, this right is not absolute and is subject to the regulation of the state in the interest of public order, morality, and health.

5. Relevant Case Law:

   • Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) (Sabarimala Case):

     • The Supreme Court held that the prohibition of entry of women of menstruating age (10-50 years) into the Sabarimala temple was unconstitutional, as it violated the fundamental rights of women under Articles 14, 15, and 21.
     • The Court reasoned that the restriction was not an essential religious practice, as it was not a requirement of the religion itself but was based on certain customs and interpretations that discriminated against women.
     • The Court also emphasized that gender equality was a fundamental right, and the practice of excluding women was inconsistent with the Constitution.

   • The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiji (1954):

     • The Supreme Court discussed the balance between religious freedom and the state's duty to ensure equality and non-discrimination. The Court held that while religious practices should be respected, the state has the right to regulate practices that violate fundamental rights.

6. Doctrine of Essential Religious Practices:

   • The Court in various judgments has applied the "essential religious practices" doctrine, stating that only practices integral to the religion itself are protected under Article 25.
   • Practices that are not integral to the religion, such as discriminatory customs, may be subject to constitutional scrutiny and can be restricted.

Application

1. Discrimination on the Basis of Gender:

   • The restriction on women’s entry into the temple is based on gender, which is explicitly prohibited under Article 15 of the Constitution. Discriminating against women in public places, including temples, is a violation of this provision unless there is a valid exception.
   • Ancient scriptures or customs, when invoked to restrict access based on gender, must be examined in the light of constitutional principles. Gender equality is a fundamental right, and such practices must be justified as essential to the religion.

2. Interpretation of Religious Practices:

   • The invocation of certain scriptures to justify the exclusion of women from the temple must be scrutinized to determine whether such practices are essential to the religion.
   • In the Sabarimala Case, the Court held that the prohibition of women based on menstruation was not an essential religious practice. Similarly, other scriptures or traditions that exclude women need to be assessed in terms of their necessity to the core beliefs of the religion.

3. Public Interest and Social Reform:

   • The Constitution mandates the promotion of gender equality as a public policy objective. Religious practices that hinder this objective are not protected by the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 if they violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
   • While religious denominations have the right to manage their temples (Article 26), this right must not conflict with constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination.

4. State Regulation:

   • The State has the authority to regulate temple practices in the interest of public order, morality, and health. The prohibition of women's entry based on religious or cultural grounds, which perpetuates discrimination, can be subject to state regulation and judicial scrutiny.
   • The state can intervene to ensure that practices which violate constitutional rights, such as the exclusion of women from temples, are modified or removed.

Conclusion

The restriction on the entry of women into the temple, citing certain ancient scriptures, is not valid under the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court in Sabarimala has held that gender-based restrictions in places of worship violate fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21. The restriction on women's entry into a public temple is a form of gender discrimination and is not an essential religious practice.

Religious customs and scriptures cannot be invoked to justify the violation of constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination. The State has the responsibility to ensure that public places, including temples, remain free from practices that discriminate against women. Therefore, the restriction must be lifted in compliance with constitutional mandates of gender equality and non-discrimination.