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PART-C

Osmania University LL.B Part C Solutions Mycets.com

Note: There is no standard solution for any type of problem in Part C, as law students we have different perspectives and interpretation so we need to focus on the Draft, Section, Articles to support your discussion.

These are Sample solutions of few of the questions which will help you to know the pattern of answer which will fetch you marks in EXAM.

 

Issue

The Hyderabad Municipal Corporation has failed to provide an effective drainage system in some areas under its jurisdiction, leading to the accumulation of wastewater on the streets. This has resulted in unhygienic conditions and the breeding of mosquitoes, thereby posing a threat to public health. The issue concerns the violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution of India and the possible constitutional remedy available to address this grievance.

Rule

  1. Fundamental Rights Violated

    • Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty: The Supreme Court of India has interpreted Article 21 to include the right to a clean and healthy environment. The failure of municipal authorities to provide proper drainage and sanitation violates this fundamental right.
    • Article 47 – Duty of the State to Improve Public Health: The Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) impose an obligation on the State to raise the level of nutrition and standard of living and to improve public health.
    • Article 243W & Twelfth Schedule: These provisions outline the functional responsibilities of municipalities, including sanitation, drainage, and solid waste management.
    • Article 32 – Right to Constitutional Remedies: It allows citizens to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights.
    • Article 226 – Power of High Courts to Issue Writs: The affected residents can file a writ petition in the High Court to direct the municipal corporation to take immediate action.
  2. Applicable Doctrines and Precedents

    • Polluter Pays Principle: Although primarily applicable to industries, this principle, recognized under environmental law, can be used to hold the municipal corporation accountable for its negligence.
    • Public Trust Doctrine: The State, as a trustee, must ensure that public resources, including clean water and a healthy environment, are protected.
    • Cases:
      • Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand (1980) – The Supreme Court held that municipalities are duty-bound to maintain sanitation and proper drainage.
      • Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) – Upheld the right to a pollution-free environment under Article 21.

Application

In the present case, the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation’s failure to maintain an effective drainage system has resulted in an unhygienic environment, violating the residents' right to health and life under Article 21. The residents can:

  1. File a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32 before the Supreme Court or Article 226 before the High Court to direct the municipal corporation to take remedial action.
  2. Seek a Writ of Mandamus from the High Court, compelling the municipal corporation to fulfill its statutory obligations.
  3. Approach the National Green Tribunal (NGT) under the NGT Act, 2010, since the issue pertains to environmental degradation.
  4. Report the matter to the State Pollution Control Board, which can take action under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986.

Conclusion

The appropriate constitutional remedy in this case is to file a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court, seeking a Mandamus directing the municipal corporation to implement an efficient drainage system. A PIL before the Supreme Court is also an option under Article 32. Additionally, complaints to environmental authorities and the NGT can be effective in ensuring long-term sustainable solutions.

Issue

The issue is whether the discharge of hazardous sludge by a fertilizer manufacturing industry into the soil and water, causing the spread of diseases in a village, violates constitutional provisions and environmental laws, and what remedies are available to the affected residents under the Constitution of India.

Rule

  1. Constitutional Provisions:

    • Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty): The Supreme Court has expanded Article 21 to include the right to a clean and healthy environment. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991), the Court held that the right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution-free water and air.

    • Article 32 and Article 226: These articles provide remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Article 32 allows individuals to approach the Supreme Court, while Article 226 allows them to approach the High Courts for writs such as mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari.

    • Article 48A (Directive Principles of State Policy): It mandates the State to protect and improve the environment and safeguard forests and wildlife.

    • Article 51A(g) (Fundamental Duties): It imposes a duty on every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment.

  2. Statutory Provisions:

    • The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: Section 3 empowers the Central Government to take measures to protect and improve the environment. Section 5 allows the issuance of directions to industries to prevent environmental pollution.

    • The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974: Section 24 prohibits the discharge of pollutants into water bodies.

    • The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981: Section 21 prohibits the emission of pollutants beyond permissible limits.

    • The Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989: These rules regulate the handling and disposal of hazardous waste.

  3. Judicial Doctrines:

    • Public Trust Doctrine: The State is a trustee of natural resources and must protect them for public use (M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 1997).

    • Polluter Pays Principle: The entity responsible for pollution must bear the cost of remediation (Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, 1996).

    • Precautionary Principle: The State must take preventive measures to avoid environmental harm, even in the absence of scientific certainty (Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 1996).

Application

  1. Violation of Article 21:

    • The discharge of hazardous sludge by the fertilizer industry has contaminated the soil and water, leading to the spread of diseases in the village. This violates the residents' right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21.

  2. Violation of Statutory Provisions:

    • The industry's actions violate:

      • Section 24 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, which prohibits the discharge of pollutants into water bodies.

      • Section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which allows the government to issue directions to prevent environmental pollution.

      • The Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989, which regulate the disposal of hazardous waste.

  3. Remedial Measures:

    • The affected residents can file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32 (Supreme Court) or Article 226 (High Court) of the Constitution, seeking:

      • Immediate closure or regulation of the industry until it complies with environmental laws.

      • Directions to the industry to clean up the contaminated soil and water.

      • Compensation for the affected residents for health hazards and environmental damage.

      • Implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle to hold the industry accountable for remediation costs.

  4. Judicial Precedents:

    • In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996), the Supreme Court applied the Polluter Pays Principle and directed industries to compensate for environmental damage.

    • In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), the Court ordered the closure of industries causing environmental harm and emphasized the State's duty to protect the environment.

Conclusion

The discharge of hazardous sludge by the fertilizer manufacturing industry violates constitutional provisions (Article 21, Article 48A) and statutory laws (Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Water Act, 1974; Hazardous Waste Rules, 1989). The affected residents can seek remedies under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution by filing a PIL. The Court may:

  1. Direct the industry to stop its polluting activities.

  2. Order the cleanup of contaminated soil and water.

  3. Award compensation to the affected residents.

  4. Apply the Polluter Pays Principle to hold the industry accountable for remediation costs.

Issue

The issue is whether the shrimp culture cultivation by Shankar Industry in the coastal area of Mandanur, which is causing soil salinity, contamination of drinking water, and adverse effects on local flora and fauna, violates environmental laws and constitutional provisions, and what remedies are available to address this problem.

Rule

  1. Constitutional Provisions:

    • Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty): The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 to include the right to a clean and healthy environment. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991), the Court held that the right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution-free water and air.

    • Article 48A (Directive Principles of State Policy): It mandates the State to protect and improve the environment and safeguard forests and wildlife.

    • Article 51A(g) (Fundamental Duties): It imposes a duty on every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment.

  2. Statutory Provisions:

    • The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: Section 3 empowers the Central Government to take measures to protect and improve the environment. Section 5 allows the issuance of directions to prevent environmental pollution.

    • The Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, 2011: This notification regulates activities in coastal areas to protect the environment and livelihoods of local communities. Shrimp culture is often restricted or regulated in CRZ areas.

    • The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974: Section 24 prohibits the discharge of pollutants into water bodies.

    • The Biological Diversity Act, 2002: This Act aims to conserve biological diversity and protect local flora and fauna.

  3. Judicial Doctrines:

    • Public Trust Doctrine: The State is a trustee of natural resources and must protect them for public use (M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 1997).

    • Polluter Pays Principle: The entity responsible for pollution must bear the cost of remediation (Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, 1996).

    • Precautionary Principle: The State must take preventive measures to avoid environmental harm, even in the absence of scientific certainty (Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 1996).

Application

  1. Violation of Article 21:

    • The shrimp culture cultivation by Shankar Industry has led to soil salinity and contamination of drinking water, adversely affecting the health and livelihoods of local residents. This violates their right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21.

  2. Violation of Statutory Provisions:

    • The industry's activities likely violate:

      • The Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, 2011, which restricts or regulates shrimp culture in coastal areas.

      • Section 24 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, which prohibits the discharge of pollutants into water bodies.

      • The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, which aims to protect local flora and fauna.

  3. Remedial Measures:

    • The affected residents or environmental groups can file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32 (Supreme Court) or Article 226 (High Court) of the Constitution, seeking:

      • Immediate cessation of shrimp culture activities by Shankar Industry.

      • Directions to the industry to restore the affected soil and water bodies.

      • Compensation for the affected residents for health hazards and loss of livelihood.

      • Implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle to hold the industry accountable for remediation costs.

  4. Judicial Precedents:

    • In S. Jagannath v. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court addressed the environmental damage caused by shrimp farming and ordered the closure of shrimp culture industries that violated CRZ regulations.

    • In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), the Court emphasized the State's duty to protect the environment and upheld the Precautionary Principle.

Conclusion

The shrimp culture cultivation by Shankar Industry in the coastal area of Mandanur violates constitutional provisions (Article 21, Article 48A) and statutory laws (CRZ Notification, 2011; Water Act, 1974; Biological Diversity Act, 2002). The affected residents can seek remedies under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution by filing a PIL. The Court may:

  1. Direct the industry to cease its activities.

  2. Order the restoration of affected soil and water bodies.

  3. Award compensation to the affected residents.

  4. Apply the Polluter Pays Principle to hold the industry accountable for remediation costs.

Issue

The primary issue is whether Mr. X’s possession of lion-shaped chinkara skins meant for sale without a license is legal under Indian environmental and wildlife protection laws.

Rule

  1. Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972

    • Section 9: Prohibits hunting of wild animals listed in Schedules I, II, III, and IV.
    • Section 39: Declares that any wild animal (alive or dead), its skin, or any part thereof is government property, and possessing or selling it is illegal.
    • Section 40: Requires any person possessing such animal articles to declare it to the Chief Wildlife Warden.
    • Section 49B: Restricts trade and commerce in wild animals and animal articles.
    • Section 51: Prescribes penalties for violations, including imprisonment up to 7 years and a fine.
  2. Chinkara (Gazella bennettii) Protection Status

    • Chinkara is listed in Schedule I of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, providing it the highest level of protection.
    • Any trade, possession, or sale of chinkara skins without authorization is a criminal offense.
  3. Relevant Doctrines and Judicial Precedents

    • Public Trust Doctrine: The government is the trustee of wildlife and must protect it for future generations.
    • Case Law: Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2010)
      • The Supreme Court ruled that poaching and illegal possession of protected animal skins constitute a serious crime against the environment and biodiversity.
    • Case Law: Centre for Environmental Law v. Union of India (2013)
      • Reinforced the strict prohibition on wildlife trade under Indian laws.

Application

Since chinkara is a Schedule I protected species, the mere possession of its skins without a license violates the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. Mr. X’s act is an offense punishable under Section 51, leading to a minimum imprisonment of 3 years (extendable to 7 years) and a fine of at least ₹10,000. Additionally, authorities may seize the skins and prosecute Mr. X for illegal trade in wildlife products.

Conclusion

Mr. X is guilty under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, and is liable for prosecution. The appropriate legal remedy is to initiate criminal proceedings under Sections 39, 49B, and 51 to impose penalties and prevent further illegal wildlife trade.

Issue

The issue is whether "X" Ltd is legally liable for setting up an unauthorized electric fence around its farm, which resulted in the death of an elephant. The case involves violations of environmental and wildlife protection laws.

Rule

  1. Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972

    • Section 9: Prohibits hunting of wild animals listed under Schedule I, including elephants.
    • Section 39: Declares that any wild animal (alive or dead) is the property of the government, and harming it is illegal.
    • Section 51: Prescribes penalties, including imprisonment up to 7 years and a fine, for offenses against wildlife.
  2. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960

    • Section 11: Prohibits cruelty towards animals, including causing unnecessary pain or suffering.
  3. Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860

    • Section 429: Makes killing or maiming an elephant punishable with imprisonment up to 5 years, a fine, or both.
    • Section 304A: Covers causing death by negligence, which is punishable by imprisonment up to 2 years or a fine.
  4. Relevant Doctrines and Judicial Precedents

    • Polluter Pays Principle: The entity responsible for environmental damage must bear the cost of rectification.
    • Public Trust Doctrine: The government holds wildlife in trust for the public and must protect it.
    • Case: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (1997) – The Supreme Court emphasized the protection of wildlife under constitutional and statutory provisions.

Application

"X" Ltd's act of installing an unauthorized electric fence directly resulted in the death of an elephant, a Schedule I protected species. This amounts to an offense under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and IPC Sections 429 and 304A. Since the fence was unauthorized, "X" Ltd cannot claim exemption under the doctrine of necessity or self-defense. The Polluter Pays Principle may also be invoked, requiring "X" Ltd to compensate for environmental damage.

Conclusion

"X" Ltd is criminally liable under Sections 9, 39, and 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, Section 429 of the IPC, and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. The company may face imprisonment up to 7 years, a fine, and liability for environmental compensation.

Issue

The issue is whether the ban on sawmills imposed by the Government of Telangana is a violation of Mr. John’s fundamental rights, specifically his right to carry on trade and business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution.

Rule

  1. Article 19(1)(g) – Right to Trade and Business

    • Grants citizens the fundamental right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business.
  2. Article 19(6) – Reasonable Restrictions

    • Allows the State to impose restrictions on trade or business in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the environment.
  3. Environment Protection Laws

    • The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Grants the government the power to impose restrictions on industries to control environmental pollution.
    • The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Regulates activities like deforestation and commercial timber operations.
    • The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 – Allows the government to regulate industries causing air pollution.
  4. Judicial Precedents

    • M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1997) (Taj Trapezium Case) – The Supreme Court upheld relocation of polluting industries from sensitive areas to protect the environment.
    • State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005) – The Supreme Court held that the right to trade is not absolute and can be restricted in the public interest.
    • T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (1997) – The SC directed restrictions on deforestation and sawmills in protected zones.

Application

The Telangana government’s ban on sawmills in and around Hyderabad is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) because:

  1. It aims to protect the environment and prevent deforestation and air pollution.
  2. It aligns with environmental laws like the Environment Protection Act and Forest Conservation Act.
  3. Judicial precedents support such restrictions in the interest of public health and environmental sustainability.

Since the ban is for public welfare, Mr. John’s argument is weak, and the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the validity of the law.

Conclusion

The legislation is valid as it falls within reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6). Mr. John cannot claim an absolute right to run his sawmill in a prohibited area. His petition is likely to be dismissed, and the closure order will be upheld.

Issue

Whether the multinational company that stored poisonous gases for pesticide production is liable for compensation when a terrorist attack caused an explosion, releasing the gases and killing thousands.

Rule

  1. Principle of Absolute Liability

    • Established in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) (Oleum Gas Leak Case), where the Supreme Court held that any industry engaged in hazardous activities is absolutely liable for harm caused, regardless of negligence or fault.
  2. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) – Strict Liability

    • Under this rule, an entity is liable for damage caused by dangerous substances kept on its premises if they escape, unless due to an act of God or a third party’s unforeseeable action.
  3. Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991

    • Mandates companies engaged in hazardous industries to provide immediate relief to victims in case of an accident.
  4. Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case (Union Carbide Case, 1984)

    • The Supreme Court held that hazardous industries must bear the cost of compensation, even in cases of unforeseen events, as they are engaged in inherently dangerous activities.
  5. Foreseeability of Risk

    • Under environmental laws, industries handling hazardous substances are expected to have adequate safety measures to prevent gas leaks, even from external threats like sabotage.

Application

  • The multinational company stored hazardous gases, which posed a foreseeable risk to the public.
  • Even though the immediate cause of the explosion was a terrorist attack, the company failed to ensure foolproof security, which resulted in the release of toxic gases.
  • Under absolute liability principles, the company cannot escape liability by claiming the act was caused by a third party (terrorist).
  • As seen in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case, even unintentional gas leaks from hazardous industries make them liable.

Conclusion

The company is liable for compensation under the Absolute Liability doctrine and Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The victims or the government can claim damages from the company, despite the cause being a terrorist attack. The company should have implemented stricter safety measures to prevent such large-scale disasters.

Issue:

Whether Kamesh, Raghu’s neighbor, can obtain an injunction to prevent the opening of Raghu’s bakery on the grounds that it might cause a nuisance in the future.

Rule:

  1. Principle of Anticipatory Nuisance:

    • Courts do not generally grant an injunction based on mere apprehension of nuisance. There must be strong evidence that an inevitable nuisance will occur.
  2. Case Law – Dr. Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal (1982)

    • The Supreme Court held that actual nuisance must exist before granting an injunction unless the likelihood of nuisance is extremely high and unavoidable.
  3. Kinds of Nuisance:

    • Public Nuisance (Section 268 IPC): Affects the general public and is addressed by public authorities.
    • Private Nuisance: Interference with a person’s enjoyment of property. Requires proof of substantial and unreasonable interference.
  4. Injunctions under the Specific Relief Act, 1963:

    • Section 38: Permanent injunctions require an existing violation of a right.
    • Section 39: Prevents actions likely to cause irreparable harm.
  5. Precedent – Sturges v. Bridgman (1879)

    • Courts ruled against an injunction when the nuisance was only speculative and had not yet occurred.

Application:

  • Mere fear of nuisance is not enough to restrain a lawful business.
  • Raghu’s bakery has not yet commenced, meaning no actual nuisance has occurred.
  • If the bakery later causes excessive smoke, noise, or odors, Kamesh can file a fresh suit for nuisance, but at this stage, an injunction is unlikely.
  • If Raghu has all necessary permits, courts will favor economic development over speculative claims.

Conclusion:

Kamesh is unlikely to succeed in obtaining an injunction unless he proves that the bakery will inevitably cause nuisance. The court may dismiss his petition for being premature. However, he can take action if actual nuisance occurs in the future.

Issue:

Whether the distillery company can be held liable for discharging effluents into the Krishna River, affecting the drinking water supply and violating the right to health of the local population.

Rule:

  1. Right to Health as a Fundamental Right (Article 21, Indian Constitution)

    • The right to a clean environment and safe drinking water is part of the right to life and personal liberty (Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991).
  2. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974

    • Section 24: Prohibits discharge of pollutants into water bodies beyond prescribed limits.
    • Section 43 & 44: Imposes penalties and imprisonment for violations.
  3. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

    • Section 3: Empowers the Central Government to take necessary measures to protect the environment.
    • Section 5: Allows authorities to shut down industries causing environmental damage.
  4. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and Precedents:

    • M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1988) – Supreme Court ordered closure of polluting tanneries affecting the Ganga River.
    • Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) – Introduced the Polluter Pays Principle and Precautionary Principle.
    • Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996) – Industries were held liable for environmental damage.

Application:

  • The distillery company violated environmental laws and constitutional rights.
  • People have the right to file a PIL in the High Court or Supreme Court.
  • Authorities can direct the closure of the distillery or impose heavy fines.

Conclusion:

The distillery is liable for environmental pollution and violation of the right to health under Article 21. The government can order its closure, and the affected residents can seek compensation through a PIL.

Issue:

  • Whether the Municipal Corporation’s decision to convert a public park into a commercial public centre is legally valid, considering the objections raised by the local NGO.

Rule:

  1. Right to a Healthy Environment and Recreation (Article 21, Indian Constitution)

    • The Supreme Court has held that open spaces and parks are essential for quality of life, and converting them for commercial purposes can violate the right to life and right to a healthy environment.
    • In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004), the Court ruled that public spaces cannot be arbitrarily converted into commercial zones.
  2. Doctrine of Public Trust:

    • The Public Trust Doctrine (M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 1997) states that natural resources, including public parks, should be preserved for public use and cannot be privatized or used for commercial purposes arbitrarily.
  3. Municipal Corporation Laws and Master Plan:

    • Under municipal laws and urban planning regulations, land earmarked as a public park cannot be repurposed for commercial use without following due legal procedures, public consultation, and environmental assessments.
  4. Supreme Court Precedents:

    • Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa (1991): The Court struck down the conversion of open spaces meant for parks into commercial areas, emphasizing the need to protect urban green spaces.
    • Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa (2004): The Supreme Court prohibited land-use change without proper justification.

Application:

  • The Municipal Corporation’s decision is illegal as it violates the Public Trust Doctrine and citizens’ rights to a healthy environment.
  • The NGO can challenge this decision through a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 226 in the High Court, arguing that the land was meant for public recreation, not commercial exploitation.

Conclusion:

The Municipal Corporation’s decision is legally unsustainable. The NGO’s challenge is valid, and the High Court is likely to strike down the conversion to preserve the park for public welfare.

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